

Essay:

OUR PRESENT POST-MODERN CONDITION

A Companion to "Hokusai's Great Wave, *Annotated*"



Endnote F. A further error seems to lie in the identification of the droplet itself...

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"Our Present Post-Modern Condition"

A postmodern theorist might put it this way: This essay will have been concerned to relate *Hokusai's Great Wave, Annotated* with current issues, theories and practices within the discursive field of literary theory. Yes: "will have been" means *is*. So now, welcome...

I. Introductory Remarks and Rapid Overview

A current correct view is that over a period of centuries (perhaps millennia, given any consideration of *Ariya*¹), Western civilization has brought guns, disease, and King James Bibles, severally and jointly ruinous, to idyllic arcadias harmoniously populated with noble savages. Thus, a concert of dead white males has everywhere subjugated, enslaved, and appropriated everyone who is other -- which means to say "white women" and "people of color." Still another current correct view is that a world-wide system (of governmental, economic, and cultural suppression) set up by a cabal of white male capitalists continues to continue, overtly and covertly. Yet another current correct view is that the science and technology of white males have brought the exhausted ecosystem of Earth to the brink of destruction. A final current correct view, at least for purposes of this paper, is that the *logocentric* discourse of white males has usurped the discourse -- even the very thought processes (mind)² -- of the other.

I am aware these allegations comprise the short list. Further, I should admit to having little problem with most of the allegations. An explanation of why I do not is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, it will be simply assumed that there is a factual basis for these allegations³ -- and, it will be asserted (just now in fact) that these allegations are part and parcel of what Lyotard has termed *la condition post-moderne*.⁴ This means to say that, for example, revisionist history and a concomitant political correctness are aspects of *la condition post-moderne*. Of course, it is this "condition of postmodernism" which is our subject here.

Earnshaw calls postmodernism an intellectual "climate" with a "strong anti-foundational rationale." Wyschograd views postmodernism as a philosophical and literary discursive style which "must forge new and necessarily arcane means for undermining the pieties of reason."

Baudrillard has it that postmodernism is a novel state of new social, cultural, and economic formations occasioned by computer technology and conditioned by mass media.

Meanwhile, Zerzan describes postmodernism as "an inverted millenarianism." Others have other views. The term postmodern is, therefore, elusive -- which Jameson suggests is the whole point. Were the term reducible to precise definition, insists Jameson, then it would not be "postmodern"⁵ -- for by definition, postmodernism resists definition.

A sceptic might say that this "fact" puts one in mind of Groucho Marx, who would not join any organization which would have someone like himself for a member. Such a self-negating yet self-referential, paradoxical and *dada*-istic tendency is perfectly matched to the inherently playful "condition" that is postmodernism. And just what, exactly, is meant by condition? A "condition" may be a situation, or it may be an illness.⁶ In a "dissemination" such as this, *jouissance* (Barthes: pleasure from indeterminate meaning; Lacan: happiness from the desire for a world without the fracture of representations) may be thus construed as a symptom of an advanced malady.⁷ We begin, then, a diagnosis.

Postmodernism is said to be "decentered." Jameson contends that, without a fixed subject or object, there can be no theory of postmodernism per se -- that, theoretically speaking, there can be only a theorization of postmodernism's own conditions of impossibility. Jameson considers this paradox to be the antinomy of postmodernity; that is, the aporia or theoretical impasse which remains unresolvable at ever higher levels of abstraction.⁸ Kellner goes even further: "[T]here is no unified postmodern theory, or even a coherent set of positions."⁹ However, because forests of paper are consigned to the fire and smoke of analytical discourse on postmodernism, one may infer that...

The situation is not entirely hopeless. Certain sweeping statements may be used to characterize postmodernism, not the least of which is Lyotard's view that "the condition" is, on the simplest level, a disallowal of sweeping statements. In this case, Lyotard means what he calls "incredulity toward metanarratives."¹⁰ Earnshaw has it that metanarratives are "grand historical schemes, schemes that try to fix me in their narratives without my consent -- Marxism, religion, nationhood."¹¹ This incredulity is extended to history itself, which is seen as the self-legitimizing discourse of the "winners" (those continuing cabals). Official histories, then, are seen as mere alternative narratives or competing versions of "the facts of events" which are

necessarily always beyond objective knowledge. At best, history is a particular construction of "facts" leading to an "understanding" which is being promulgated by institutionalized forces. For example, history texts in the United States describe the American Revolution in terms of a struggle for "freedom" and "the rights of man." At the same time, British books view the revolt of the colonies as the consequence of certain administrative difficulties. History is therefore pliant and unreliable. This leads to postmodernist objections to assertions of "fact" -- and to what has been described as an "ahistorical belief in the immanence and sublimity of current existence (the 'now', 'the contemporary', radical otherness)"; as well as to "postmodernism's unwillingness to accept its own historical status."¹²

History, after all, is perpetuated in received texts; but it is not just "the facts" which are unreliable and at issue. Language itself, which frames the facts, is problematic. Why this is significant is explained by Zerzan:

In terms of systematic thought, the growing preoccupation with language is a key factor accounting for the [postmodernist] climate of narrowed focus and retreat. The so-called "descent into language," or the "linguistic turn" has levied the post-modernist-poststructuralist assumption that language constitutes the human world and the human world constitutes the whole world [...], an alarming withdrawal into what Edward Said [calls] the "labyrinth of textuality."¹³

Zerzan's observation goes hand-in-glove with common current complaints about the debasement of language and of words being drained of their meaning. The notion that "words have meaning" has for centuries been predicated upon a relation between sounds articulated and things named -- that is, the relation between a signifier and a signified.

Enter Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist who wrote nothing but whose students published contradictory classnotes¹⁴ based on his lectures in semiology/semiotics. F de S¹⁵ posited the theory that the relation of words to objects is entirely arbitrary.¹⁶ Importantly, he suggested that signifiers convey meaning not by any relation to the objective world but by their relation(s) to each other. That is, meaning is a network of conventions -- which implies that the phenomenal world, being without essence, is then only a system of signs distinguishable by their differences one from the other. It follows that if words constitute the world, and these are being "debased and drained of meaning," then the world is being debased and drained of meaning. Many wordsmiths find this prospect disturbing.

The usual suspect assigned fault for the debasement of words drained of meaning is deconstruction, the quintessential post-structuralist approach/method/philosophy/strategy. The draining and debasement presumably result from deconstruction's demonstration of the indeterminacy of meaning for any given signifier. That is, a signifier is determined by other signifiers -- or, more conventionally, a word is defined by other words which are themselves defined by other words, ad infinitum. Or, *ad nauseum*, if the demonstration of indeterminacy leads to the clever inversion of meaning as occurs in Miller's deconstruction of the binary opposition, host/parasite.¹⁷ Structuralists like Saussure "have generally... taken the binary opposition as a fundamental operation of the human mind basic to the production of meaning."¹⁸ Derrida "decenters" these oppositions by demonstrating that one of the terms is always already privileged, and that such oppositions ultimately relate to what he terms a "transcendental signified" which is groundless. Binary oppositions, then, ultimately refer to nothing at all which is immediately and authentically "present." Terms of an opposition refer ultimately to whatever distinguishes one term from another within the linguistic system; so "meaning" is therefore contingent, ungrounded and indeterminate, and the relation between signifiers and signifieds is unstable (each referring to the other). According to Eagleton, "Saussure's stress upon the arbitrary relation between sign and referent, word and thing, helped to detach the text from its surroundings and make of it an autonomous object." This detachment carries with it "the belief that reality, and our experience of it, are discontinuous with each other."¹⁹ As Derrida broke with Saussure's structuralism, his deconstruction of "reality" worked out as a much more radically extreme fracture in human conscious experience. Words, meanings, and reality itself all came to be seen as "deferred." Hence, as Jameson argues, postmodernism has disrupted our sense of temporality and made of it a radically discontinuous perpetual present in a reality which is nothing more than the immediacy of random signifiers sans fixed meaning.

In sum, for Derrida, "meaning" arises from the differences distinguishing signifiers, and the "meaning" of any one signifier is always deferred. Because a signifier is "explained" by other signifiers which, in turn, are in need of explanation, meaning is only an effect of the language system. No signifier ever signifies a signified which is immediately fully present or grounded. Of course, this reiteration of the foregoing two (2) paragraphs conjures a dissemination of meaning predicated (grounded?) upon Derrida's neologism *differance* (now nearly a technical term, it is a portmanteau conjoining two French verbs correlative with the

English nouns difference and deferral). Unlike everything else in the universe, *differance* is always already everywhere present. It would seem, then, to be on offer as a transcendental signified. Still, given the instability of the relation between signifier and signified, and the rather large metaphysical assumption that there is no grounded presence anywhere (discussed further, *infra*), one understands why postmodernist thought is characterized as a turn of mind which takes the form of an epistemological skepticism in extremis.

A concrete example may be traced in the postmodern conception of *textuality*. To a postmodern sensibility, and for reasons set forth above, the *text* is considered radically unstable and its meaning is indeterminate. But what is meant by the *text*? (We will strive, unwittingly, for a fixed meaning.) The *text* is, of course, any text -- and by implication the sum total of all texts is a single *text* due to the operation of dissemination of meaning with its concomitant proliferation of context. And, because any "immediate experience" is now impossible as a result of its being always already mediated by a chain of significations, the world, too, is seen as *text*. "In short, Baudrillard's world of simulacra... a world without reference or fixed meaning."²⁰ Hence, Derrida's statement that "there is nothing outside the *text*" (*il n'y a pas de hors-texte* -- a statement often misunderstood and sometimes mistranslated, Derrida's "*de hors-texte*" is better understood to mean "outside the context"; see *Hokusai's Great Wave*, n. 124).

If texts are indeterminate (not at all the same as being "undecidable", as Derrida argues; please see N.B. after the Endnotes which follow this essay), then history is indeterminate. This seems an ideal point of departure, then, to dare an historical sketch -- a pseudo-quasi-semi-hemi-demi mini micro-metanarrative.²¹ This narrative will be concerned with one of the foundational texts of the (*logocentric*²²) text.

It seems to me that the postmodern conception of textuality has historical roots in 19th century biblical exegesis. However, as it happens, the exegetes of the last century did not appear by spontaneous generation nor exist in a vacuum. (Beware, reader: you are about to experience a fracture in time thanks to this text). Their views were built upon -- or, at the very least, followed -- earlier views. (We shall return to the 19th century very soon.)

In the 11th century one Isaac ibn Yashush, a Jewish court physician in Muslim Spain, raised doubts about the authorship of the Edomite Kings list, which appears at Genesis 36.²³ Ibn Yashush thought these kings lived after Moses, and that he therefore could not have written of

them. These doubts were expanded by Abraham ibn Ezra (12th century Spanish rabbi), by Bonfils (14th century scholar at Damascus), by Tostatus (15th century bishop of Avila), by Carlstadt (15th century exegete and commentator), by Andreas van Maes with Benedict Pereira and Jacques Bonfrere (16th century Jesuit scholars). During the Enlightenment, doubters included the philosophers Hobbes and Spinoza -- and also Isaac de la Peyrere.²⁴ An example follows of two simple, direct reasons for doubt:

[T]he Five Books of Moses included things that Moses could not have known or was not likely to have said. The text, after all, gave an account of Moses' death.

It also said that Moses was the humblest man on earth; and normally one would not expect the humblest man on earth to point out that he is the humblest man on earth.²⁵

By the nineteenth century, Geddes, Vater, and Wette advance what will become known as the Fragmentation Theory. This is followed in 1823 by Ewald's Supplemental Theory and in 1840 by his Crystallization Theory. At mid-century, there are variant versions of a Developmental Theory supported by Granberg, Vatke, George, Reuss, and Graf. In 1850, Hupfield launches a modified Documentary Theory that by 1878 becomes Wellhausen's full-blown Documentary Hypothesis, which still influences new wave exegesis. The basic thrust of these theories is that the Pentateuch (or Torah, the first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures, whose authorship is traditionally assigned to Moses²⁶) is compiled of four (4) distinct sources (J, E, D, and P).²⁷ These sources²⁸ are believed to have been written at different times in different places.²⁹ Further, they are believed to have been heavily edited by a "redactor" -- perhaps the author of D. Finally, there are dozens of variant versions of these texts -- and often no certain means to determine which text is the oldest or most reliable copy of (a) long-lost original manuscript(s).³⁰ Obviously, this problem leads to questions about the reliability of received texts.

Now for another problem: that of the interpretation of a received text. As an example, we could start at the beginning -- the so-called P document (by some reckonings, not the beginning) which is *Genesis* 1:1. The context immediately widens to include two different Judeo-Christian conceptions of God. I think we shall see, however, that the context is bounded while, at the same time, it may be extended at will -- and that, although there is a proliferation of context which is

indeed possible, the issue (or "meaning") at stake will be determinate (i.e., clear enough).

Genesis 1:1 reads:

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. (AV)

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. (RSV)

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. (AS)

In [the] beginning God created the heavens and the earth. (NW)

When God began creating the heavens and the earth... (LB)

In the beginning, when God created the universe, the earth was formless and desolate. (GN; this rendering conflates verse 1 with part of 2).³¹

The first four translations strive to be literal, while the last two are paraphrases. Their differences in tense, where these exist, may be accounted for by differences in the forms of verbs as between Hebrew and English. The Hebrew form is (more or less) similar to the past perfect continuous tense in English. (For some, this fact has standing for attempts to reconcile *Genesis* with Darwinian theory.) On the whole, these six variant renderings convey a meaning readily intelligible in English. However, a major difficulty lurks behind the scenes.

That difficulty is the competing Judeo-Christian conceptions of God -- the strictly monotheistic view and the later trinitarian view -- both of which may be demonstrated by this single passage. A trinitarian apologist would point to the word for God (*elohim*) and note that it is in the plural form. However, a strict monotheist would claim this form is a rhetorical device expressing "fullness of majesty" and then point to the singular form of the verb "create" (*ba`ra*) -- as well as to some extra-textual source such as Deuteronomy 6:4 (the *shema*). Still other questions may be asked: Is *elohim* cognate with El, the old Canaanite high god (whose precursor may have been a Sky God)?³² In this way context proliferates, yet the issue at stake is clear.

Arguments about the provenance and interpretation of biblical writings continue to pit against one another scholars from such august institutions as Hebrew University, Oxford Theological Seminary, and Yale Divinity School. Questions raised by exegetes of biblical texts are not unlike the objections raised by critics of the works of Shakespeare, James Joyce, or any number of other "canonical" writers. At bottom, the questions turn on the reliability of received

texts and what may be inferred from these -- and this, in turn, is a question of best evidence. (I intend to return to this assertion.)

II. Matters of Textuality

Here, too, there is an intention.

To continue, there is also the assumption that I had an intention -- or, at the very least, a *mens rea* -- at the point of beginning *Hokusai's Great Wave*.

I think of *Hokusai* as a metaphor, analogue, or manifestation -- what Zitelli describes as "a vehicle for communicating [my] complex response to the present condition of literature and theory."³³ This "condition" includes questions about authorial intention, the topic toward which I will have just now directed this discussion. After, I intend to discuss other matters of textuality. Also, I intend to make reference to *Hokusai*. And, I did. Just now.

(The *authorial intention* behind explaining my intention is to acknowledge the status of this discourse as a self-referential meta-text which is not only "over" *Hokusai* but "over" *itself*. This condition obtains for *any* meta-text, and it is, according to Harris, the cause of many illusions.³⁴ For the purpose(s) here, I will admit that both the reader and I could sustain this regressive illusion and perhaps suffer the effects of vertigo -- but we will simply put it aside for now.)³⁵

With the postmodern emphasis upon language, any discussion of authorial intention will begin by defining terms. Author derives from the medieval term *auctor*. Pease writes that "the term 'author' raises questions about authority." By this, he refers to the division of medieval learning into the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*, with each discipline within the division having its own *auctor*, or foundational authority. In rhetoric, for example, the *auctor* was Cicero. In astronomy, the *auctor* was Ptolemy. An *auctor* was the discoverer of first principles and the giver of rules within a discipline. The continuing authority of an *auctor* was contingent upon the ability of scribes to resolve new problems by new analyses framed in terms of an interpretation or restatement of the writing of an *auctor*. The many restatements then also commanded authority. According to Pease, "[w]orldly events took place in terms sanctioned by an authoritative book or were not acknowledged as having taken place at all."³⁶ Thus, *auctores* and

scribes were authorities who explained life, the universe, and everything. This cultural authority was sanctioned by medieval monarchs who legitimated their divine hegemony by virtue of the precedents established by *auctores* and explicated by scribes. A circular system obtained, a closed system which continued more or less unchallenged (there are always unorthodox or heretical opinions) until the discovery of the New World.

The cosmogonies and social arrangements of the New World did not correspond with the precedents established by *auctores*. Whoever sent an account of the New World back to European readers was immediately an authority -- but an authority of a new kind. *The basis for authority had changed*. The writer of the account did not vouch for assertions by appeal to Aristotle, but by personally guaranteeing the truth of the assertion made. Thus, writers became authorities, or authors. And, of course, the assertions of the new authors worked toward fundamental changes in European society. For example, newly described "noble savages" of the New World served to underwrite theories of Natural Law and the social contract. In this case, theory led to revolution and civil war in Europe -- and to administrative difficulties in the English colonies.

With the coming of the Romantics, authors metamorphosed into inspired geniuses who ruled individualized imaginary worlds, a confederacy of petty states which Pease reminds us was the "Republic of Letters." However, by this twentieth century, the autonomy of the genius was usurped by the critic. The critic interpreted the work of the author, and thereby established the role of criticism along lines similar to the role of restatements by medieval scribes -- that is, to explain life, the universe, and everything. Authors became separated from their writings in the sense of no longer having authority. A foundational text for this usurpation of the *auctor's* role is "*The Intentional Fallacy*" by Wimsatt and Beardsley, two New Critics who "turned the demotion of the author to a function of the critic's text into an explicit part of critical practice."³⁷

The New Critic's *autotelic* text was, as the term implies, self-contained -- and it was the critic who read it closely and served up its explication. The approach was intensely intrinsic. By definition, the autotelic text was not determined by extrinsic considerations such as an author's alcoholism, love affairs, or suicide attempts. Nor was it influenced by social events such as potato famines, student demonstrations, or stock market crashes.

This swing to the critic as auctor has been offset by critics themselves -- those of the neo-Marxist, Feminist, neo-Freudian, and Frankfurt schools -- namely, critics who have emphasized some form of historical context. In some cases, these critics are concerned with authorial intention.

The basic difficulty with authorial intention lies in how it is to be known. A writer may state an intention. As the writer behind *Hokusai*, I could designate Zitelli's remark as accurately reflecting my intention -- and I have so done. In a court of law, this would be considered direct evidence. However, more often than not, courts of law are concerned with the pragmatic. In literary theory, we have the luxury of epistemological doubt. We are permitted to ask whether absolute knowledge is possible, including whether an author can know her own mind. Interestingly, we do have direct evidence from a writer, Gide, that this may not be possible. Gide speaks of *le parte de dieu* and asks how he can understand what he has written until someone tells him what it says. This appears to mean that what Gide writes may not have been clear to him in the first instance.³⁸ It might be inferred that Gide may still not yet understand what he has written should different readers give him very different interpretations of his own writing. It is also possible to take Gide's doubt and extend it to his statement about *le parte de dieu*. Did he understand what he meant in speaking of this, or does he again need someone to tell him? Is his statement self-negating and therefore meaningless? Of course, Gide may merely conclude that what he has written or said is contradictory -- or, at the very least, ambiguous.

Ambiguity does not work as a bar against literature, however. Nor does it necessarily work as a bar to the law -- say, for example, in a court's interpretation of the Constitution which is framed in "majestic generalities." Patterson argues that Supreme Court Justice Brennan views the Constitution as "a text in the sense that literary studies have privileged, that is to say, enigmatic."³⁹ States Justice Brennan: "Like every text worth reading, it is not crystalline."⁴⁰ Although Brennan is referring to the Constitution, his statement seems to say that any text is not worth reading unless it is ambiguous. Now, this interpretation is my response as a reader. (To continue with this line, see *the appropriate endnote*).⁴¹

However, the context is *authorial intention*, which we were discussing in terms of an author's *ambiguity*. Here I will argue that, just as Justice Brennan may have recourse to *The Federalist Papers* in order to resolve ambiguities fostered by the framers of the Constitution, the

meaning of an author may be ascertained by going outside her text and considering her intention *vis-à-vis* her writing (whenever a close reading is insufficient for a reasonably accurate interpretation). Admittedly, this approach does not end with some theoretically absolute certainty about an author's intention (remember Gide), but it is also not unlike tuning instruments to an absolute pitch. We may not, technically, yet be in tune -- but it's close enough for jazz.

Some interpretations will be better than others. A reader is, one supposes, entitled to the view that *Hokusai's Great Wave* is really about the 1919 Chicago Black Sox Scandal; or, that it is a meditation upon Yeats's poem, *The Wild Swans at Coole* (1916). One may also argue whether the evidence available will support either contention. Let me say that I was reading about one, and studying the other, at the time of writing the first "epiphany" (Idos refers to this passage as *epicleti E1*).⁴² To the best of my knowledge – i.e., *le parte de dieu* notwithstanding – there is no way to connect *Hokusai* with the Black Sox. Nor did I intend to do so. (It would probably not even occur to a reader to attempt this, except that I have suggested it here.)⁴³ However, it is most certainly possible to connect *Hokusai* with Yeats's poem. This follows from a mention of Lady Augusta Gregory in the epiphany. It is reinforced by a footnote, which I also wrote. How far should this allusion be pursued? I am not saying. Why not, because ...

Authorial intention may be permeated with vested interests. In the case of M. George Le Beauceaux, a fictional *auteur*, it is the search for immortality. But, of course, this fictional author is the creation of another author, Peregrine Alain L'Gardinier Riche. His intentions may be far more difficult to ascertain because, as his publisher states, at the time of Riche's passing he did not leave a note.⁴⁴ Neither biographical information nor entries from Riche's journal is of any avail in ascertaining for a certainty what was his intention in writing *Feast of the Epicleti* – although there are several indications why he undertook to write revisions of that text, coercion being foremost.

This implies that not only authorial intentions work upon a text, but also the intentions of others who have contact with it. If there is a single best example to illustrate what this often entails, it would have to be the sacred texts of Judeo-Christianity. One reader, Thomas Jefferson, edited out from the Greek scriptures every passage he thought objectionable.⁴⁵ The medieval Cathars of the Languedoc region of France accepted only the *Gospel of John*. Hebrew scribes, from a superstition, replaced the name of God with the title *adonai*.⁴⁶ Ehrman writes of the

orthodox corruption of scripture, by which he means to say that translations follow the development of dogma.⁴⁷ Such development may affect canonicity: *The Shepherd of Hermas* (once-canonical and explicitly monotheistic) has been relegated to the *pseudepigrapha*. Did this demotion occur because trinitarian conceptions began to be advanced? Are other reasons possible?

That a source may be "corrupted" is of prime importance in any consideration of the transmission of texts. What is striking about the examples above is that they are known to have happened. This has implications (enter *diachronic* studies). We have the evidence of "source material," which is to say earlier versions of the texts (there are no extant originals for any books of the Hebrew or Greek scriptures). These may be comparatively analyzed. Differences accruing over the course of transmission may be noted. These differences may be correlated with extrinsic considerations (enter *synchronic* studies). Ehrman describes the problem and how it may be overcome:

To be sure, it is impossible to establish an argument on scribal intentions; the scribes are no longer available for questioning, and even if they were, their intentions might well lie beyond our reach (and theoretically, even beyond theirs). All the same, it is possible to evaluate the fruits of their labors -- by determining, that is, how the text appeared before they copied it and seeing how it had been altered once it left their hands. By establishing the earliest form of the text, we can construct a functional taxonomy of its subsequent modifications: some serve to improve the grammar of a text, others to eliminate discrepancies, still others to effect harmonizations. And others change the text's meaning, or to put a different slant on it, "improve" its theology. It is not only thinkable that scribes would make such changes, it is manifest that they did.⁴⁸

The method Ehrman prescribes for analyzing sacred texts will also apply in the case of secular writings, where we may (or may not) have "original texts" (first drafts, say). There is "no single authorized text" of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*⁴⁹ for example, but there are several variant versions.⁵⁰ A German translation, *Der Bestrafte Brudermord* has an entire scene that occurs also in the *First Quarto* (1603), but in no later edition of Shakespeare's plays.⁵¹

We do have first drafts of James Joyce's variant texts -- and these are striking examples of how an author's revisions and *errata* may contribute to the problem of the definitiveness of her text. No sooner did Sylvia Beach print *Ulysses* in 1922 in Paris than a list of *errata* was compiled by Joyce. But his own corrections are at times inconsistent.⁵² A much later "corrected text" of *Ulysses*⁵³ claimed to set right some 5,000 errors (an average of seven errors per page in previous editions) involving omitted "words, phrases, and even entire sentences" -- but the corrected text, too, *is not* without error.

An example may serve to illustrate Ehrman's approach (apologies should I err) as it may be applied to questions turning upon intention, revision, excision, vested interests, "textual corruption," ambiguity, context and interpretation. I refer to L'Gardinier Riche's analysis of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, which is the basis for what follows.⁵⁴ Riche's reading claims that the issues surrounding the marriage of Gertrude and Claudius closely parallel those surrounding the second marriage of Henry VIII.

Hamlet was written around 1600-01, at the end of the long reign of Elizabeth I. She was, of course, the daughter of Henry VIII and his second wife, Anne Boleyn. The reign which immediately preceded Elizabeth's was that of Mary I, daughter of Henry VIII through his first wife, Catherine of Aragon.

Henry was Catherine's second husband. In order for Henry and Catherine to wed, a dispensation was sought from Pope Julius. The *Bull of Dispensation* was necessary due to strict Catholic adherence to *Leviticus* 18:16, which the *Geneva Bible* of 1560 sets out as "Thou shalt not discover the shame of thy brother's wife: for it is thy brother's shame." This passage worked against the marriage because Catherine already had been wife to Henry's brother, Arthur.

The Levitical prohibition, however, was mitigated by Deuteronomy 25:5 which states "When brethren dwell together, and one of them dieth without children, the wife of the deceased shall not marry to another; but his brother shall take her, and raise up seed for his brother." As Arthur died young, and as Catherine bore him no children, the way was cleared for Henry to take her in marriage. His role was that of *levir*.

The union of Henry and Catherine lasted some eighteen years, but it failed to produce a male heir to the throne. Because the dynastic War of the Roses (fought between the Houses of York and Lancaster) was still very much in the public memory, Henry took seriously the matter

of a male heir. When Catherine could not provide one, he sought to marry Anne Boleyn. But, in order to do so, Henry first had to dispense with the Bull of Dispensation. To do that, he needed a strategy.

According to Rosenblatt, Henry's decision to divorce Catherine "was authorized primarily by the text of *Leviticus*, which he interpreted as a divine prohibition the Pope was not permitted to set aside."⁵⁵ For Henry, then, his marriage to Catherine was null because *the dispensation which permitted it* was null. Pope Clement VII defended Julius's bull by marshalling the 16th century's best and brightest into a counter-offensive based upon the verses in *Deuteronomy*.

Rosenblatt demonstrates the controversy turned upon the translation of *Ah/Ahfrater*, used to mean "brother" in the Hebrew and Latin Vulgate texts of both *Leviticus* and *Deuteronomy*. In the Henrician formulation, the word "brother" was translated strictly in the *Leviticus* passage, but distorted into "kinsman" (*cognatus*) in *Deuteronomy*. That a "kinsman" may do what a "brother" may not do was then supported by tables and charts explaining degrees of consanguinity and affinity.

The dispensability of the Levitical prohibition, then, became a question vehemently debated by Protestants and Catholics. "The Reformation leaders held that the Levitical prohibition was fixed for all time by divine law, [and] that no dispensation could validate Henry's marriage to his dead brother's widow."⁵⁶ Rosenblatt holds the significance of all this *vis-à-vis* Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is that "an audience asked to convict Claudius and Gertrude of incest is at the same time being asked to take the Henrician side in the Scriptural controversy."⁵⁷ And, this controversy will have an effect upon the text of *Hamlet*.

The very first words spoken by Hamlet are "A little more than kin, and less than kind."⁵⁸ *These nine words are loaded*. They could mean: closer than nephew, yet not so close as a son. They indicate the speaker is not at all kindly disposed toward his uncle/father, Claudius, whose foregoing words -- "But now, my cousin Hamlet, and my son" -- they cuttingly parody. Hamlet's aside alludes to "the version of *Deuteronomy* that he (and the audience) accepts, where kinsman may marry a man's widow, but a brother may not."⁵⁹

Old Hamlet's demise surely leaves Gertrude a widow. She is not, however, without children. Her son Hamlet's existence admits impediment to her re-marriage with Claudius. Absent Hamlet – *i.e.*, if he did not exist – her union with her brother-in-law would be acceptable

in accordance with the provision in *Deuteronomy*. However, the provision in *Deuteronomy* was unacceptable to Anne Boleyn's daughter, Elizabeth, whose political legitimacy depended upon the Henrician formulation. But no matter, for Gertrude and Claudius marry in defiance of the most permissive interpretation of *either* biblical passage – and their dextrous posting to a four-poster's "incestuous sheets" galls Hamlet because it denies him.

More than a cursory examination of Riche's extremely intricate delineation of the interrelation of Shakespeare's sources and editions is impossible here. Nor is there space to correlate the various texts with sundry historical events of a religious-political nature. At best, a single line of Riche's inquiry may be sketched by the (admittedly too few) examples following.

A reconstructed memorial version of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* appeared in the 'bad' *First Quarto* (Q1) of 1603. In that same year, Queen Elizabeth I (Tudor) died, and James I (the son of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, who was beheaded by her cousin Elizabeth) acceded to the throne of England. Interestingly, the title page of Q1 reads:

The Tragicall Historie of Hamlet
Prince of Denmarke
by William Shake-speare.
As it hath been diuerse times
acted by his Highnesse seruants
in the Cittie of London: as also in
the two Vniuersities of Cambridge
and Oxford, and else-where.

The title page makes it clear that the play was printed at the beginning of James's reign. It is also easy to infer that the play must have been widely performed during the reign of Queen Elizabeth – unless we are to assume that the performances in London, at Oxford and Cambridge, and "else-where," together with the printing of Q1, all happened within a space of less than a year.

Wofford states that Q1 is without real textual authority, but then allows that "its readings are valuable in supplementing, corroborating, or correcting" the *Second Quarto* (Q2) and the

First Folio (F1).⁶⁰ As mentioned above, and more to the purpose here, Q1 contains one scene which is not found in Q2 or in F1, but which is found in *Der Bestrafte Brudermord*, the German adaptation played widely in the early 1600s by touring English comedians.⁶¹

In accordance with the title page, it is generally agreed that Q1 is a reconstruction of Hamlet as it was actually performed. This means that the audiences for Q1 and *Bestrafte* saw a scene not included in later editions of the play.

Gertrude figures prominently in the missing scene, which occurs at Act IV, Scene 6. This scene differs markedly from the same scene in Q2 and F1. In it, the queen learns from Horatio the news contained in Hamlet's letter to him. That is, Gertrude learns of Hamlet's escape and impending return. She then becomes an active ally in her son's cause against Claudius.

"Points of contact" between Q1 and *Bestrafte* are remarked by Wofford.⁶² Rosenblatt finds in *Bestrafte* an allusion which hints at larger implications of incest in Shakespeare's play. He cites the Closet Scene, in which we find Gertrude complaining:

Had I not taken in marriage my
brother-in-law, I should not have robbed
my son of the crown of Denmark. But what
can be done about things that are done?
Nothing, they must stay as they are.
Had not the Pope allowed such a marriage,
it would never have happened.

From this we gather that Gertrude's marriage to Claudius, like the marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon, required a dispensation from the Pope. Prince Hamlet, remember, is in line with a strict reading of the Levitical prohibition as formulated by Henry and perpetuated by various Protestant translations of the *Bible* used by Shakespeare and his audience.⁶³ This formulation led to dissolution of Henry's marriage to Catherine, thus freeing him for the marriage to Anne Boleyn, who produced Shakespeare's queen.

The character of Gertrude "changes dramatically from the *First* (and 'bad') *Quarto* to the *Folio*."⁶⁴ Clearly, the change is not on the side of clarity. Once the active ally in Q1 and

Bestrafte, Gertrude becomes ambiguous and passive in all the versions that follow. Is this change only incidental, or does it signify a shift in prevailing political winds?

The significance of Gertrude's active alliance with Hamlet in Q1 and *Bestrafte* is easily inferred. English and German audiences would have understood her actions as a positive affirmation of the Levitical prohibition and an implicit approval of (Protestant) Elizabeth's claim to legitimacy. Gertrude's actions in *Bestrafte* deny the efficacy of her dispensation. This is the very strategy which permitted Henry VIII to marry Anne Boleyn.

Q1, printed the year James I succeeded Elizabeth, says nothing about the dispensation alluded to in *Bestrafte*. Does this omission imply that English audiences were now denied seeing what German audiences might see? In Q2 and the later F1, Gertrude's lines no longer show any clear indication of her alliance with Hamlet. Taken together, the two omissions have the effect of cancelling the queen's former direct denial of the Pope's dispensation. This makes less clear her position *vis-à-vis* the provision for levirate marriage in Deuteronomy. *A public safety valve remains, however, in that Claudius has offended both biblical texts.* Still, a door has been opened, if in fact this was the intent behind the excisions and additions presented to the Jacobean audience.

Such is Riche's reading of *Hamlet*, with which I cannot entirely concur -- but that is beside the point here. The point is that, while reasons behind changes in the text are open to question, there can be no doubt that Gertrude's role *did* change. Versions of *Hamlet* printed after James's accession may vary wildly: Q2 is roughly twice the length of Q1, while F1 differs from Q2 by nearly three hundred lines. Modern editions usually present a conflation of F1 and Q2.⁶⁵ Consequently, modern editions are quite removed from Q1 and *Bestrafte*. Further, modern audiences are removed from the issues of Shakespeare's day. It is these issues, and the forces surrounding them, which must be considered in the analysis of texts and their transmission. Whether these can be said to have an impact upon a text will be a question of best evidence.

Obviously, the possibility for a reading such as Riche's is based upon historical context. To the extent that history is preserved (or perpetuated) in texts, an historical context is necessarily and simultaneously a textual context. For a discipline like history, dependent upon texts, the implication is plain: if all texts are radically unstable and context is always everywhere indeterminate, then there can be no history *per se*.

The importance of context generally, and of historical context in particular, is stressed by Earnshaw who writes:

Remove anything from its context and it becomes the plaything of infinite signification. But allow back context and the possibility of less ambiguous explanation becomes increasingly available... [I]t is the removal of context that is the jump into illusion and contrived ambiguity. [...] Contexts are available and have the function of stabilising.⁶⁶

Earnshaw's point, which he elsewhere states explicitly, is that the better we understand context, the better chance we have of obtaining a determinate meaning. I think this is not to deny that ambiguity exists. A poet, for example, may purposively write ambiguously. All that need be done is to employ words or constructions which are inherently ambiguous -- a practice which also makes for one aspect of the craft of lawyering. It is possible, too, that a writer may intend to be clear and fail. Some writers, after all, are more skillful than others.

It seems self-evident that context may proliferate -- an assumption of cross-indexing systems, of links on the internet, and of fascinating conversation. The postmodernist claim is, however, of a different order entirely, and it is absolute. The claim is that instability of context is true for all texts, every time -- so that meaning becomes always indeterminate (if not impossible). What is truly available is only an "effect of meaning."⁶⁷ This is not an insignificant claim. The examples which follow will address aspects of this claim.

In James Joyce's *Ulysses*, there is an issue of interpretation respecting the denouement of the brothel scene when Stephen says to his mother's ghost: "Tell me the word, mother, if you know now. The word known to all men." The ghost of Stephen's mother does not reply. According to Ellman, "readers have supposed that the word known to all men must be love, though one critic maintains that it is death, and another that it is *synteresis*."⁶⁸

Obviously, the context may permit competing interpretations claiming that love or death is "the word known to all men." *Synteresis*, however, is another matter. This follows from the fact that, at this writing, I have no idea what this word means -- and, presumably, I am a member of that class designated by *all men*. I consider it demonstrated that the context definitely precludes this reading.

A proliferation of context occurs in Joyce's *A Portrait*, when Stephen envisions himself "a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedec."⁶⁹ Now, who is this Melchizedek (Septuagint: Μελχισδεκ)? In Hebrew, the name means "legitimate/righteous king."⁷⁰ Melchizedek was both king of ancient Salem and priest to Yahweh (Jehovah), the most-high God.⁷¹ Salem, identified with Jerusalem,⁷² means "peace" -- and so the apostle Paul calls Melchizedek the "King of Peace."⁷³ Manuscript 11Q*Melch*, one of the Dead Sea Scrolls, describes Melchizedek as a heavenly being who passes judgment

in the time of the tenth or last Jubilee, on Belial and those of his sort. The judgment takes place in heaven, and immediately there follows the 'days of slaughter' prophesied by the prophet Isaiah. Here, Melchizedek is both judge and executor of his own decree.⁷⁴

Joyce's text is an allusion to *Psalms* 110:1, 4 which entails a promise of God given to King David *vis-à-vis* David's "lord":

Jehovah saith unto my Lord...

Thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek.⁷⁵

This passage provided the writers of the Greek scriptures with "a subject for typological interpretation" in that he is both a king and a priest -- in which instances he is said to resemble Jesus and to be an *antetype* of the savior or Messiah.⁷⁶ Paul makes a direct link between Melchizedek and the Messiah in writing of "Jesus, who has become a high priest according to the manner of Melchizedek forever."⁷⁷

The point here is that a larger, but still limited, context contains the proliferation of Joyce's allusion to Melchizedek. The context extends to notions of the Messiah in both Hebrew and Greek sources. Perhaps it then extends to Coptic or Syriac sources, as well. It does not, however, extend to notions of the *Metteya* of Pali (Buddhist) scriptures, even though this incarnation may be viewed as a type of Messiah. I suspect that containment comes of the Roman Catholic Stephen wanting to be a Jesuit: "The Reverend Stephen Dedalus, S.J."⁷⁸ This limits the context to Judeo-Christianity.

That institutions may have an interest in containing context is illustrated by the Roman Catholic interpretation of *Matthew* 16:18. The passage reads: "You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church." The passage is claimed to support the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, which in turn legitimates the authority of the Pope. After all, the name *Peter* means "stone" -- and therefore the speaker, Jesus, is saying that Peter will be the "foundation" of the Christian church. This interpretation is reinforced by a list, supplied by the institution, of the names of individuals who are said to have succeeded to the Chair of Peter.

However, a competing interpretation is predicated upon the proliferation of context. Consider what seems to be Peter's own understanding of the word "*stone*" at 1 *Peter* 2:4, which reads: "Coming to him [*i.e.*, Jesus] as to a living stone, rejected, it is true, by men, but chosen, precious, with God." That Jesus is "a living stone" seems supported by Paul's remark at 1 *Corinthians* 10:4. This passage reads: "...and the rock was Christ." Further, Paul elsewhere extends the image to include Peter and others, while he simultaneously clarifies who is the "*stone*": "And you have built upon the foundation of the apostles and the prophets, while Christ Jesus himself is the foundation cornerstone" (*Ephesians* 2:20). This passage, in turn, may put a reader in mind of an ancient Hebrew writing which claims "The stone that the builders rejected has become the head of the corner" (*Psalms* 18:22) -- which passage itself occurs within a context alluding to a coming One (*i.e.*, Messiah), and which also appears to be the source of the image at 1 *Peter* 2:4, above.

Does anything arrest the proliferation of context? Suppose, for example, that the word "stone" puts a reader in mind of the Stone of Ramkhamhaeng.⁷⁹ This is where a sense of chronological history comes into play, and helps to delimit the context of what seems to be a self-referential pun upon Peter's name. It is doubtful that Jesus's remark has anything to do with the Stone of Ramkhamhaeng. Perhaps closer to our context, it is doubtful that Jesus's remark has anything to do with another of his sayings: "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Such a delimitation of context works against the too-broad claim that "texts possess a radical indeterminacy which makes the possibility of a right or wrong interpretation of any work impossible."⁸⁰ As we shall see, the delimitation of context has implications for intertextuality, as well.

The above approach may be applied to an entire body of writing -- for example, the texts of Gnostic Christianity, which date from ca. 200 C.E. The Gnostic *Nag Hammadi* texts have had a profound effect in American theological seminaries, where it is now common to speak of early Christianity in terms of "diversity."⁸¹ Early on, Gnostic views (and other readings) were competing with, say, the Pauline view. Paul's writings, from ca. 55 C.E., are critical of certain variations of Christianity (1 *Timothy* 1:19, 20; 4:1-3), as are Peter's writings (2 *Peter* 2:1-3). But Paul's writing, in fact, explicitly denounces "what is falsely called gnosis" (γνῶσεως knowledge; 1 Tim. 6:20).

Question: Why would anyone advocate Paul's seeming prejudice, when many different forms of Christianity were on offer? Early Christianity, after all, was diverse.

The answer may turn on how one views the Apostles themselves. Peter, for example, accepted Paul's authority to speak and write (*Acts* 15:1-29) -- as did John, who is reputed to have been Jesus's favorite among the inner circle. In 95 C.E., the fifteenth year of Domitian's reign, John wrote *Revelation* (or *Apocalypse*) while confined to the island of Patmos. He, too, wrote against certain variants of early Christianity (1 *John* 2:18, 19; 3:4-8; 5:16, 17). His letters to the seven churches confirm the presence of "Gnostic ideas in other churches of the same area of Asia Minor" (*Rev.* 1-3).⁸² This wariness of certain variants may accord with the view of Jesus, who warned against "false prophets" (*Matt.* 7:15-23; *Mark* 13:21-23). The authority of the Apostles' misgivings *vis-à-vis* diversity of readings may then be predicated on their relation to, and understanding of, the teachings of Jesus.⁸³

Given the assumption that institutions have an interest in controlling context, one may wonder about the recent emphasis upon, and proliferation of, writings which reflect the wide variety of Gnostic teachings. That is: Why the current institutional emphasis upon the diversity of early Christianity? One answer may be that diversity is, after all, a current value supported by the government of the United States, a pluralistic nation. Adoption of a first principle, or value, that no one interpretation is any less valid than another can be seen as a means to lessen the basis for tension between groups with competing readings.

The question of *value* has been (and remains) an important subject for, or object of, critical scrutiny. The term seems to name "an aspect of the world so fundamental to our thinking -- so elementary and at the same time so general -- as to be both irreducible and irreplaceable."

The notion of *value* is said to have two related but distinct senses, both of which involve comparison and amount: namely, that of an *equivalence-in-exchange*; and that of a *relative measure of positivity*. In either instance, value involves "the extent to which something is held in esteem" and suggests "an inherent property" which is singular and "independent of anyone's experience of it." It is in this latter sense of an immaterial, intrinsic, and *pure quality* that value is said to distinguish literature from all other texts.⁸⁴

Pure quality, of itself, has been held to be "the source and substance of everything" insofar as it is the stimulus "upon us to create the world in which we live."⁸⁵ For this cause, "quality, value, creates the subjects and objects of the world."⁸⁶ Presumably, this "world" would include literature and literary criticism.

The foregoing "explication" of *value* should make clear the metaphysical status of the term, at least in its general sense.⁸⁷ It seems to conjure an immaterial essence not unlike the notion of an immortal soul which is independent of any physical manifestation. It is not a hard day's work to understand the postmodern position that *value* is, at best, merely normative. Of itself, *value* has no objective reality -- and is therefore said to be groundless or without foundation.

To the extent that an evaluation is made according to criteria, it is based upon notions of value. For a postmodernist, this is to say that evaluation is grounded upon that which is groundless. *Value*, then, is a signifier signifying nothing. This anti-foundationalist strain within postmodernism, with its absolute assumption that all values are groundless, leads to a "legitimation crisis." This is a crisis in which there are no "principles which can act as criteria of value for anything else."⁸⁸

I wish to take issue with this anti-foundationalist position that there is no ground for any value whatsoever. (I will admit that, as an author with intentions, I have the idea that this discussion will connect with Derridean *differance* -- and with the notion of reflexivity or infinite regression. Also, before beginning, I will conjure a context.)

Hoagland is not alone in noticing that "right at the heart of Western ethics is what is called, under one of its names, the Golden Rule."⁸⁹ Notice Hoagland states there is more than one name. This will have some importance, later.

The West is not alone in advancing some version of this principle: *Do unto others that which you would have them do unto you*. In the *Analects* of Kung Fu-tse (Confucius), the formulation is negative, as it is with the Essene, Hillel: *Do not do to others that which you do not want done to you*. Of course, there is a distinction between the two versions in that the former is a call to action, while the latter is passive. Still, the two may be compared in that each reflects something essential [*sic*] -- and that, I would argue, is a manifestation of Derrida's *différance*.

We are told "Kant (1724-1804) treated the Golden Rule with disdain, saying that it cannot 'serve...as the rule or principle,' that it is only 'a deduction from' the supreme principle."⁹⁰ Although Kant is joined here by a chorus, I will politely submit that their view is mistaken. The Rule *is* the ground -- and because it is alleged that the Rule has no ground, here I will begin the discussion.

Since Kant, questions of value have been predicated upon a priori concepts. It seems to me the question whether a priori concepts exist is unimportant. That is, they are not necessary to establish a ground for ethical behavior. What is necessary is the structure of the human brain, which has both the capacity for rational thought and the capacity for memory. Due to the operation of these two capacities, a principle is discoverable in daily transactions. This principle is reciprocity -- which is formulated in both the positive and negative statements of the Golden Rule.⁹¹

The importance of the principle lies in the rational acknowledgement that one cannot make a claim for oneself without allowing the claim of the other. Reciprocity bids one to make the imaginative leap of placing oneself in the position of the other. To that extent, it serves to break down the binary oppositions of *self/other* and *subject/object*. Recognition that the other is similar to oneself (*i.e.*, human) leads to the proposition that the other may make claims similar to those claims made for oneself. To say that the other has similar claims is to assert that the other has similar rights. The reverse is also true: If the other has rights, then one's self, too, has rights.

One cannot do violence or injustice to the other without treating the other in a manner that one's self would find objectionable. To ill-treat the other is, then, to objectify the other -- that is, to deny the full humanity of the other. And this denial, however subtle, is a lie. (Recall that, at one point in U.S. history, an African slave was three-fifths of a person.) To deny the humanity of the other is to deny rationality itself, and the principle that it calls into being.

What is seldom noticed is that the principle is indefinitely reflexive. It requires that if *I* would be forgiven or excused, or have my shortcomings or mistakes overlooked, then I must reciprocate. From this comes the instruction to turn the other cheek, and not to judge unless *I* myself would be judged. Which is only *fairness* (one of Hoagland's other names).

Obviously, *reciprocity* (another of Hoagland's names) occurs within the context of *self/other* – and there is oscillation in the reflexivity which produces a recognition that, paradoxically, the self and the other are somehow identical. This oscillation is, I think, a manifestation of *differance*. And it may be said that each term defines the other and that, therefore, ethics resides in a space of co-dependency, even contingency (for its exercise or application is through the autonomous individual).⁹²

All the same, a principle which obtains in the ethical realm may not serve in the realm of the aesthetic -- unless, for example, a stage play contrives to move (manipulate) the audience to some action which is at the expense of the other. To that extent, the play would be an instrument for objectification of the other, and the playwright (together with anyone involved with the production of the play) would be the agent of objectification.

I see no immediate connection between reciprocity and, say, aesthetic values. It may remain so that no objective criteria for beauty can be established. It may also remain an open question whether *Sula* is better than *Jane Eyre* is better than *Moll Flanders*. It may be that arguments *vis-à-vis* the canon will continue indefinitely. The only real problem I see is that, while arguing about the canon and questions of aesthetic value, we may begin to treat one another as objects.

It is almost too obvious to observe that besides having an impact upon questions of canonicity, *value* informs any critical interpretation of any literary work. Just as an author has a *weltanschauung* (world view) which posits fundamental assumptions about life, the universe, and everything, so has a critic – as does any other reader. *Value* is necessarily related to evaluations. The question then becomes whether the *weltanschauung* of any individual necessarily precludes their ability to discover and transmit best evidence.

At this point, we might consider what Tyndale had to say about the dispensation of Henry VIII. Given his *weltanschauung*, Tyndale surprised nearly everyone's expectations. Rosenblatt writes that certain translations of the *Bible* -- *Coverdale* (1535), *Geneva* (1560) and the *Bishop's*

(1568) -- distorted *Deuteronomy* 25:5 in accordance with the Henrician formulation for translating *Ah(frater)*.⁹³ However, not all Protestants distorted this verse:

William Tyndale's correct translation of the verse in *Deuteronomy* is an admirable exception: "the wyfe of the dead shall not be given out unto a straunger: but his brotherlawe shall goo in unto her and take her to wife" [citation omitted]. Indeed, Tyndale's exegetical integrity enforces a position of moderation on the question of Henry VIII's divorce. Given the tenor of his expose of prelatical abuse in his earliest known work, *The Practice of Prelates* (1530), one would expect Tyndale to defend the divorce on the grounds of the Levitical prohibition. Yet even in his anti-Catholic polemic, he contends at some length that the terms of the levirate marriage in *Deuteronomy* should protect Catherine's status as the King's lawful wife.⁹⁴

Recall that King Henry VIII beheaded one Sir Thomas More over this very question. More died in 1535. Tyndale wrote his defense of Catherine's status in 1530. What was his intention? Did he understand the risks of his point of view, and of his translation of *Deuteronomy* 25:5? He may have done. It is a case of best evidence.

Tyndale's translation was published in Germany ca. 1524 -- apparently with the help of Luther -- and then smuggled into England. Why was it necessary to smuggle this book? Why would Tyndale, six years later, write an explication of his translation of *Deuteronomy* 25:5? It is a documented historical fact that Tyndale was later arrested and found guilty of heresy and -- even though both he and Henry VIII were Protestants -- that he was burned at the stake on 6 October 1536.

III. Consequences and/or-both/and Aftermath.

Where postmodernism has not the cachet of radical chic, it is often regarded as rebel anarchy -- an assault by Virtual Visigoths upon reality, rationality and the foundations of science and philosophy. Its perceived *modus operandi* leaves "objective truth" as so much groundless, scorched-earth. One *weltanschauung* may be plundered as readily as another, for none is best.

That's the negative view. A positive view would posit that each and every religious, ethnic, political, and sexual ideology, preference, orientation, or style has equal validity – or, at the very least, no less validity. This suggests the claim that each is equally justifiable (with the possible exception of a metanarrative) – or, at the very least, that there is no basis for criticizing a particular view. From this stance follows the current movement toward diversity and multiculturalism, a movement which has profound effect upon individuals and institutions within our democratic society.

Because universities are "universal," the halls of academia may serve as "society" (or even "the world") in microcosm, and the issues and concerns of a university may be seen as reflective of those of society (or, again, the world). To that extent, it is telling that many observers currently see, at university, the loosest of confederations:

During the past thirty years the ideal of the unity of learning, bequeathed to us by the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, has been largely abandoned. With rare exceptions American colleges and universities have dissolved their curricula into a slurry of minor disciplines and specialized courses.⁹⁵

"Dissolved curricula" appear in part to be a consequence of diversity and multiculturalism, as English Departments, say, strive to represent a chorus (for some, cacophany) of voices: Anglo-American, Afro-American, Asian American, Latin American, Feminist, Marxist, Gay-Lesbian, etc. These, in addition to 19th Century British Novels, Shakespeare History Plays, Rhetoric, Survey of Science Fiction Literature, English Composition 201, and the Theatre of Bertold Brecht. Of course, the variety of voices echoes the heterogeneity of late 20th century American society.

American education is tied intimately to the process of democratization -- and just as it is difficult to build a public consensus in a heterogeneous society, it is difficult to write a coherent curriculum appropriate to the inculcation of a heterogeneous studentry. After all, the values of everyone involved are incommensurate. Hence, attempts to design curricula which are everything to everyone. Hence, the alleged loss of coherence and the increasing fragmentation of learning. About fragmentation's "grand scale" aspects, Wilson writes:

The trend cannot be reversed by force-feeding students with some of this

and some of that across the branches of learning; true reform will aim at the consilience [i.e., coherent integration and ultimate unification] of science with the social sciences and the humanities in scholarship and teaching.⁹⁶

The integration of learning, assuming that it is not only a desirable goal but a justifiable one, can only be effected by some appeal to authority. This is the bind: one foundational assumption of anti-foundationalism is that there "are no ahistorical criteria" for moral and intellectual judgments.⁹⁷ How, then, to demonstrate the validity of an appeal to authority when values are incommensurate (*i.e.*, when communication fails)? Wilson has suggested

there are four types of validity claims: comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness (sincerity), and normative rightness. These are...implicit in every speech act. In most empirical situations we resolve our conflicts and disagreements by a variety of strategies and techniques. But to resolve a breakdown in communication, we can move to a level of discourse and argumentation where we explicitly seek to warrant the validity claims that have been called into question. Ideally, the only force that should prevail in such a discourse is the "force of the better argument."⁹⁸

Now, it should be clear from the above discussion of reciprocity that I think there is an ahistorical basis (*i.e.*, a warrant) for moral decisions and ethical behavior. However, I also recognize that it is inconsistent with reciprocity to coerce assent to that principle. The most one can do is make a persuasive argument respecting (apparently) ahistorical criteria. But the possibility of "making the better argument" seems precluded by the very attitudes which inform our present postmodern condition:

For we live in an era when there is a suspicion of reason, and of the very idea of universal validity claims that can be justified through argument. [...] We have become masters of the suspicion of the hermeneutics of suspicion.⁹⁹

Thus, the problem for the designers of curricula is that of the engineers of society:

To ask if consilience can ever be gained in the domains of the innermost circles, such that sound judgment will flow easily from one discipline to another, is equivalent to asking whether, in the gathering of the disciplines, specialists can

ever reach agreement on a common body of abstract principles and evidential proof.¹⁰⁰

It seems that, in a sense, the designing of curricula is the intersection of a number of interrelated questions or difficulties which constitute our postmodern climate. Here, it is useful to consider value and its link with language and how this then connects with larger considerations -- namely, whether Western rational discourse necessarily ends in either fragmentation or, as Weber suggests below, suppression.

Weber "despaired about the possibility of rationally grounding the ultimate norms that ground our lives" -- and he argued that "the hope and expectation of the Enlightenment thinkers was a bitter and ironic illusion"; that modernization destroys the foundations of a traditional *weltanschauung* and leaves only a void. For Weber, the legacy of the Enlightenment was the "triumph of Zweckrationalitat" which did not lead to universal freedom, but rather to an "'iron cage' of bureaucratic rationality from which there is no escape." In Weber's modern world, there are only "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; [a] nullity [which] imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."¹⁰¹ Postmodernism would transcend this poverty of spirit by celebration of *jouissance*, and it would escape Weber's "iron cage" by undermining the foundations of rationality. Presumably, the resulting "proliferation" (fragmentation) would be of benefit to individuals and so, ultimately, to society. As Bentham once observed, "the public is a fictitious body." Society is, after all, a collection of individuals. It might then be expected that whatever ails "society" will affect the people in it, individually and severally. (We will return to the notion of suppression.)

In a postmodern society, language is problematic. Language, of course, is considered *logocentric* -- that is, embedded with patriarchal values and assumptions about life, the universe, and everything. Recall, too, that language is a system of arbitrary signs with no determinate meaning. This is where the difficulty lies, in the way we relate to one another, which necessarily involves the use of language. Certain consequences follow from the view that language is as arbitrary as values are arbitrary. And, this view can have bizarre out-workings for individuals and for collections of individuals.

A woman, for example, may now be *lesbian* (and not a bisexual) even where she loves a man and has longstanding and exclusive sexual relations with him -- simply because the woman regards herself as a lesbian.¹⁰² After all, if the woman regards herself as a lesbian, that's an end to it -- for upon what ground may the meaning of any word be delimited? Moreover, who has the right to say what this woman is or is not? (Definition of words here becomes a question of "value" not unlike the determination of a curriculum, although this analogy is less than exact.)

It seems to me that such a view denies to language its public function, usurps it, steals it from the public domain -- in the sense of converting public property. That the public are willing to condone such a conversion on the ground of the validity of a highly idiosyncratic "interpretation" -- or on the ground that any person is free to define their "self" in such a way as this woman is "free to love whomever she pleases" and yet remain a *lesbian* -- is simply to nullify language in order to mollify the fiat of that individual. Words have social dimensions. In a case such as this, context -- that is, the totality of the woman's actions -- seems to demonstrate the doubtfulness of her claim. That members of the gay- lesbian community are offended by this distortion of the term *lesbian* is clearly indicated by two remarks: 1) "You can lose your lesbian membership card [by doing what lesbians do not, by definition, do]"; and 2) "It is a political and cultural insult." That the distortion may have repercussions for a community is indicated by the remark: "It raises the old issue of choice [*vis-à-vis* sexual preference]." (Interestingly, the woman's response to criticism by the community -- "It doesn't matter what others think" -- was to assert her freedom.)¹⁰³

What if we suppose that a democracy must guarantee the "right" of an individual to have words mean whatever that individual wants them to mean? Is this an argument to support the proposition that other individuals, presumably with equal rights, must accept that definition? Or, have we reached an *aporia* which leads to the consideration of a fine sentiment? According to Rorty, who advances the cause of anti-foundationalism: "Social purposes are served [...] by finding beautiful ways of harmonizing interests, rather than sublime ways of detaching oneself from others' interests."¹⁰⁴ Now what could this assertion possibly mean? What is the ground for this assertion? How is a collection of individuals, as a society, now to proceed? It seems obvious that if the foundational assumptions of anti-foundationalism prevail, the only means available to determine the meaning of a word is necessarily the carrot and stick of governmental fiat. Then we begin to enter, through an ajar side door, Weber's bureaucratic "iron cage." If not

this, then the obliteration of meaning will render any form of discourse impossible. That is a cage of another type. We would no longer be able to say what we mean and hopefully expect others to understand it. What consequences would this have for society? If entropic obliteration of meaning may only be contained by governmental regulation of meaning, then, ultimately, an *aporia* arising from basic disagreement over definition/language/value leads to *proairesis* -- "a use of freedom to lose freedom."¹⁰⁵

All these difficulties can be seen as the consequence of an extreme epistemological doubt. The doubt has been traced back to a Cartesian point of departure and, recently, an alternative route has been suggested along Baconian lines. It is Rorty who argues that the philosophy of science advanced by Descartes took the ability to do science as an "essential" aspect of "true" human nature. According to Rorty:

Descartes preserved just those themes in ancient thought which Bacon had tried to obliterate. The preservation of the Platonic idea that our most distinctively human faculty was our ability to manipulate "clear and distinct ideas" [...] was Descartes' most important and most unfortunate contribution to what we now think of as "modern philosophy." [...] The recovery of a Baconian, non-Cartesian attitude toward science would permit us to dispense with the idea of "an internal theoretical dynamic" in science, a dynamic which is something more than the "anything goes that works" spirit [of Bacon]... It would free us from preoccupation with the purported tensions between the three "value spheres" distinguished by Kant and Weber, and between the three sorts of "interests" distinguished by Habermas.¹⁰⁶

Of course, Rorty is suggesting that Western *logocentrism* might have taken a different course. This implies that there was (is) nothing inevitable about the evolution of Western civilization, that Western civilization might have developed along different lines, and that, even now, it may still change course. All this, without denying history or abandoning cause and effect. All this, merely by picking up an *other* strand of *logocentric* discourse. Wilson, even if not precisely in point, seems to concur:

The unity of knowledge [Bacon] conceived is remote from the present-day concept of consilience, far from the deliberate, systematic linkage of cause and effect

across the disciplines. His stress lay instead upon the common means of inductive inquiry that might optimally serve all the branches of learning. He searched for the techniques that best convey the knowledge gained, and to that end he argued for the full employment of the humanities, including art and fiction, as the best means for developing and expressing science. Science, as he broadly defined it, should be poetry, and poetry science. That, at least, has a pleasingly modern ring.¹⁰⁷

Wilson continues:

If contemporary scholars work to encourage the consilience of knowledge, [...] the enterprises of culture will eventually devolve into science -- by which [is meant] the natural sciences -- and the humanities, particularly the creative arts. These domains will continue to be the two great branches of learning in the twenty-first century. Social science will split within each of its disciplines, a process already rancorously begun, with one part folding into or becoming continuous with biology, and the other fusing with the humanities. Its disciplines will continue to exist but in radically altered form. In the process the humanities, embracing philosophy, history, moral reasoning, comparative religion, and interpretation of the arts, will draw closer to the sciences and partly fuse with them.¹⁰⁸

Now if Wilson is correct, the ongoing paradigmatic shift is already made possible by the very paradigm being criticized and/or reconstructed. This is to say that the assumptions informing rational Western discourse allow for a questioning of the assumptions informing rational Western discourse. Postmodernism is then seen as part of the process of critique. To bring this discussion back to the specific example of the fragmentation of a curriculum within an English department, this process may be seen as a provisional search for a new canon which would preserve those ancient *logocentric* texts which are perceived to still have value or usefulness (Bacon's writings, perhaps?), and add to these texts *other*, newer voices which are now participating in a more comprehensive Great Conversation. The canon is not unlike a list of the ten books one would take to a desert isle. Over time, one's list will change -- and it may possibly improve. The questioning of certain books on the list should not cause undue concern. There have always been other voices (heretics or dissenters, for example) surrounding the Great

Conversation. There are even contentious voices within the canon: after all, Karl Marx keeps company with Adam Smith. And, it seems unlikely that there will ever *not be* disagreement so long as there are institutions and individuals who are critical of those institutions. It is characteristic of Western civilization to allow doubt and dissent (and to that extent indeterminacy), but the general movement is toward understanding, coherence, and meaning.

IV. Conclusion(s).

What then might be said about the condition of postmodernism?

The postmodern condition of extreme epistemological doubt is only a restatement of what has long been our human condition. The evidence for affirming a fact may be strong and compelling, but there remains always the possibility for denying that evidence -- even where the affirmative evidence is better than the negative evidence. A sceptical argument can always be constructed on a purely theoretical ground -- that of "absolute knowledge." This is to admit that *it is possible* (probability never being zero) that the sun may appear to rise in the west and set in the east *someday* -- because we cannot say, *absolutely*, that our current physical laws will hold for the day after tomorrow. The point is conceded, but I will be placing no bets upon it.

Sometime before the advent of postmodernism, a debate raged between the medieval Schoolmen who divided into Realists and Nominalists. The Schoolmen's debate was "roughly comparable to that between Platonists and Aristotelians; the Realists (oddly) holding that Reality lay in abstractions whereas the Nominalists in particulars."¹⁰⁹ Their debate was merely the return of an "old riddle":

If abstract concepts are in the mind -- or if, as Occam suggests, the logical "terms 'animal' and 'man' are universals because predicable of many, not through themselves, but for the things they signify" -- then what in reality is the object signified by the universal term or concept?¹¹⁰

The debate was continued by Locke, who held that it was necessary for humans to "be able to use sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within [the] mind, whereby they might be made known to others"; and countered by

Berkeley; who held that words acquire general significance "by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind."¹¹¹ Berkeley argued humans mistakenly suppose that "every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines [them] to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name."¹¹² Here, we are not far from the indeterminacy insisted upon by postmodernism.

That human reality is constructed of signs and is, therefore, nothing more than a chain of significations is prefigured by Augustine's discussion of conventional and natural signs.¹¹³ This led to the Schoolmen's debate, which was also background to the New Criticism:

"The Anagogic view of criticism thus leads to the conception of literature as existing in its own universe, no longer a commentary on life or reality, but containing life and reality in a system of verbal relationships."¹¹⁴

A system of signs, then -- a chain of significations -- this view appears to be a fair summation of the postmodernist conception of /life/ and /reality/.¹¹⁵ So, it is sometimes observed that the issues raised by *postmodernism* are recycled:

The problems with postmodernism and the avowed crises in epistemology and ontology are not really new, even if we have deigned to give them a new name. It is instead most likely the old chestnut of how we are to know ourselves.¹¹⁶

Just as postmodernists find the notion of history meaningless, so did the Gnostics, who held to a cyclical view of events and hoped to escape from temporality into an immaterial, spiritual existence. For a postmodernist, to be in cyberspace may not be equated with a spiritual existence, but postmodernists do often complain temporality and quote Stephen Dedalus to the effect that "History is a dream from which I am trying to escape." History, recall, is a text -- and Derrida tells us "*Il n'y a pas de hors-texte*." This "Derrida paradox" puts Wilson in mind of the Cretan paradox -- *i.e.*, a Cretan says "All Cretans are liars."¹¹⁷ It puts me, however, in mind of a Schoolman's question: "How many angels can stand upon the head of a pin?"

Not only is it held that the arguments of postmodernism are little removed from the Scholastic debates between Realists and Nominalists, it is even argued that nothing much has

changed since the disputations between the Sophists and the Dialecticians. (To that extent, postmodernism is a variant of one of the voices in the Great Conversation.) What has changed is the intensity of the debate, its mass and weight and the speed with which these move. The postmodern condition, it seems, is not unlike that of Alice's Red Queen, who must run twice as fast just to stay in the same place. But this analogy applies only to theory -- it says nothing about the impact of theory upon a *psyche* or a society or a global village. Will the argument reach light-speed? Will its impact upon masses of folk reach critical mass? Stay tuned to find out. Meanwhile, what follows is my own (quite possibly) myopic view.

The obvious intention behind labeling *Hokusai's Great Wave, Annotated* as a "post postmodern classic" (besides the placement of a tongue in a cheek to a depth of .05) is to signify that postmodernism is past. (Passing, anyway.) True, there are in the popular media such recent titles as *Deconstructing Susan* and *Deconstructing Harry*, but the popularization of medical terminology is no indication of the health of a patient. This strained metaphor has as its object a self-referential return to this essay's early mention of *condition* as "illness." This then, is the context. Now follows the prognosis.

The cure lies in recognizing that postmodernism is contextually and historically bound. After all, it *followed* Modernism. Another pill to swallow is that meaning is contextually bound and therefore determinate. After all, if meaning is indeterminate to the degree that postmodernists would have us believe, how is it that so many agree about the meaning of Derrida's texts? I take it as demonstrated, above, that the post-structuralist claim that "we can never limit the number of contexts that can be legitimately applied to a text"¹¹⁸ is simply off the mark. Again, it has been noted that "critics who insist upon the indeterminacy of literature are usually just as sure of their interpretations, and write in just as confident a fashion as critics who believe in determinate meanings and correct interpretations."¹¹⁹ In the case of Derrida, he is known to have been critical of American deconstructors for, at times, misapplying his theories.¹²⁰ From this fact it follows that there are authorial intentions which can be made known, correct readings which can be urged and, consequently, the possibility that some interpretations will be inaccurate (if not dead wrong). This does not deny that difficulties still exist. We are still dependent upon the best

evidence available in order to support a position – and obviously, some evidence will be better than other evidence. Deciding which is which is an exercise in the freedom of argumentation.

A final injection is to counteract the postmodernist claim that there is no grounding or foundation for any value whatsoever. This may be so in questions of aesthetics and taste, but I must insist it is not so in questions of ethical behavior. The principle of reciprocity, which breaks down the distinction between "self" and "other" (or "subject" and "object") refutes this claim of anti-foundationalism and shows it to be wide of the mark, if not wrong-headed.

When I say that postmodernism is over, I mean that certain foundational assumptions of post-structuralism are shown to be incorrect – that its claims have been challenged and refuted by a considerable and growing number of writers. Even now, for many, there is something of the period style about postmodernism -- something romantic, *fin de siecle*, and pre-postmillennial. One cannot help thinking: "Hark, a swan's song." But swans, as I well know, continue to flourish – although some may say they are only alate simulacra.¹²¹

Nevertheless, a debt of gratitude is owed to postmodernism, and to deconstruction in particular. Just as the unexamined life is not worth living, so too are unexamined ideas not worth perpetuating. The postmodernist critique has forced many to a reconsideration of basic assumptions. By calling into question the Great Conversation, the talk has become considerably more lively.¹²² So, what then of our "post postmodern condition"?

It may be that, metaphorically speaking, we will never reach the end of the century, as Baudrillard maintains.¹²³ (The so-called Y2K computer problem may see to that.) Still, season continues to follow season and, like most people, I do not wind my sun dial with metaphors (so to speak). All the same...

Even should the whole world collapse in confusion, it will have done so for a reason. The reason may even be that, everywhere, everyone came to believe that life is pointless and meaning is made with mirrors. Still, inescapably, that would be a reason. And this is the tough causal nut postmodernism cannot crack.

I say this to remind myself that "Things are never so bad they can't be worse."¹²⁴

ENDNOTES

1. *Ariya*. In Sanskrit, this controversial term means noble. It is variously used to signify a prehistoric people said to have invaded Iran and Northern India; or the language from which the Indo-European tongues of South Asia are descended; or the 19th century term for "Indo-European"; or the speakers of Indo-Iranian languages; or the linguistic sense of "Indo-Aryan languages"; or the synonym for descendants of Noah's son, Japheth.

According to Yogi Aravind, the word *ariya* is cognate with *ar* "to plough" (thus, the Brahmanic ploughing ceremonies of Southeast Asia); with *ar* "to fight" (thus, the Greek god of war, Ares); with *arete* "virtue" (thus, the combined ideal of the Brahmana and the Kshatriya castes); with *aristos* "noble man" (thus, an aristocrat). The perfected Aryan is the *Arhat* -- "a transcendent consciousness... [which] accepts the apparent limitations of individuality for work, for various standpoints of knowledge," and who is identified "in all parts of his being [with] the triple and triune Brahman." Those individuals who have limits for work and for knowledge, apparently, are the non-Aryans -- namely, those who depart from the ideal of the Brahmana caste, and who "tend toward the ignoble, mean, obscure, rude, cruel, or false" -- the *Anarya* or *Anari* (Yasna 30.6, Gatha Ahunavaiti; Rig Veda X.124).

The Persian king Darius the Great described himself as "Aryan, the son of an Aryan." So did the German National Socialists who, as a matter of historical fact, incarcerated and incinerated millions of non-Aryans, especially Semetics (*i.e.*, descendants of Noah's son Shem). It has been alleged often that the *Ariya* are responsible for "all the progress that mankind has made." Interestingly, the Aryan script of the *Rig Veda*, Sanskrit, is a second generation adaptation of Aramaic, a Semetic script. There are other examples.

See Yogi Aravind, "Arya: Its Significance" (pars. 2,3,4,8; electronic text):

http://www.hindunet.org/hindu_history/ancient/aryan/aryan_arvind.html

The coming Buddha is *Ariya Metteya* (cf. discussion at 238, *supra*). Sukhothai Stone Inscription No. 3 (1357 C.E.) tells of "the immense period of ignorance that will begin in the year 5000 of the Buddhist Era." This period concludes when Ariya Metteya descends to earth from the Tusita Heaven. A.B. Griswold and Prasert Na Nagara, "The Epigraphy of Mahadharajaraja I of Sukhodaya," *Journal of the Siam Society* 61.1 (1973) : 83, 85; reprinted in *Epigraphic and Historical Studies* (Bangkok: Historical Society, 1993).

2. Heady stuff, this. It seems to imply that the other is forced to think like a dead white male -- that is, *logocentrically*. If it is so that *logocentrism* usurps and thoroughly controls the thought of the other, how then does any challenge to this mode of thought ever arise? Inference: The mode

of *logocentric* thought may be pervasive, but not to the extent that it precludes freedom of thought.

3. Obviously, support for the allegations would involve such examples as the slave trade throughout Africa and the policies of Cecil Rhodes in the Congo; the unequal treaties of Dutch and English East India Companies throughout Asia and the Opium War in China; the exploits of the conquistadors throughout Central and South America and the workings of the hacienda system in Argentina; the extermination of indigenous peoples throughout North America and the confinement of survivors to reservations, etc.

4. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*; trs. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

5. Fredric Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

6. Cf. Susan Sontag, *Illness As Metaphor*.

7. That malady is almost universally identified as late-stage Capitalism. Jameson speaks of postmodernism as the "logic" of late capitalism.

8. Sean Homer, "*Fredric Jameson and the Limits of Postmodern Theory*" (par 2; electronic text). Essays on postmodernism or postmodernist theory which are cited as electronic texts may each be found on the internet at the following world-wide website:

<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~pashton/essays/postmodernism.htm>

9. Douglas Kellner, "In Search of the Postmodern" (par. 3; electronic text).

10. Lyotard xxiv.

11. Steven Earnshaw, *The Direction of Literary Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); p. 64.

12. Earnshaw 80, 78.

13. John Zerzan, "The Catastrophe of Postmodernism" (par. 4; electronic text).

14. A pertinent example here, possibly attributable to Saussure's students, is the confusion arising over the definition of *langue*/language and its employment in Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*. According to translator Roy Harris, the technical uses of *langue* "sometimes appear to be at odds with one another" (xv). In a chapter entitled *Mecanisme de la langue*, the term employed throughout is *langage* (Course 119 n.1). Given that Saussure is said sometimes to use the two terms interchangeably, I consider the following passage an example of the confusion:

A language, defined in this way from among the totality of facts of language, has a particular place in the realm of human affairs, whereas *langage* does not.

Harris remarks that "Engler's *Lexique de la terminologie saussurienne* distinguishes uses of *langue* under no less than ten different headings" (xv).

15. **Notice that context makes this symbol intelligible.**

16. Saussure carries the notion of the arbitrariness of the sign over to writing, as well. That is to say, there is no natural connection between marks which indicate sound and the natural world. This view appears arguable. For example the letter T, says Saussure, has no connection with the sound it denotes (117) -- yet it may be a diagram of the tongue striking the palate. The letter O may be the shape of the mouth during production of the sound it represents. And of course, ancient Chinese ideograms directly represent the natural world.

17. J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic As Host" in Harold Bloom, et al., *Deconstruction & Criticism* (New York: Continuum, 1995) 217.

18. Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975) 15.

19. Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996) 86, 94.

20. Homer (par. 7).

21. "Like most historical narratives, this one will cover an immense trajectory of time in a short space." Donald Pease, "Author" in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin, eds. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990) 105.

22. *Logocentrism* is the term which references the privileging of *logos* (λογος) in Western discourse, and it is *logos* which is Derrida's "transcendental signified." Because *logos* is associated with capacities which are (supposedly) exclusively male characteristics, the portmanteau *phallogocentrism* (referencing the phallus) has also been coined to describe Western discourse. The significance of *logos* within Western discourse may be seen in two foundational texts: Plato's *Phaedrus* and the *Gospel of John*.

In Dissemination (including "Plato's Pharmacy"; hereinafter D and PP respectively), Derrida reveals contrary significations of *logos* which obtain from the play of *pharmakon* (φάρμακον) within Plato's text. Derrida analyzes Socrates's tale of Theuth (i.e., Thoth, the inventor of writing) and follows a "chain of significations" *vis-à-vis* Plato's chain of significations which derives from *pharmakon*. What I propose is to trace Derrida as he follows Plato, because it seems to me that the chain leads to places only hinted at in PP -- and to certain surprising implications.

The most resonant trace of *pharmakon* is Derrida's attempt "to untangle the hidden forces of attraction linking a present word with an absent word in the text of Plato" (PP 130). Writes Derrida:

The circuit we are proposing is, moreover, all the more legitimate and easy since it leads to a word that can, on one of its faces, be considered the synonym, almost the homonym, of a word Plato 'actually' used. The word in question is *pharmakos* (wizard, magician, poisoner), a synonym of *pharmakeus* (which Plato uses), but with the unique feature of having been over-determined, overlaid by Greek culture with another function. Another role, and a formidable one. The character of the *pharmakos* has been compared to a scapegoat (PP 130).

This signified, scapegoat, is richly significant. Socrates is called a magician by Plato, and when he is condemned for corrupting the youth of Athens, he drinks hemlock (a *pharmakon*). His death purifies the city -- rids it of perceived evil -- which fact makes of Socrates a scapegoat. In fact, Socrates's trial and condemnation play out during the annual ceremony of the scapegoat (Culler 143-144).

Again, the chain of significations begins with Socrates's telling of Theuth's invention of writing. Observes Derrida: "Plato had to make his tale conform to structural laws. The most general of these [...] govern, and according to the same configurations, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian mythology" (PP 85) -- and this is where I would trace Derrida, for his statement leads to certain implications *vis-à-vis* the term *phallogocentrism*.

Elsewhere, Derrida states that the Egyptian figure of Thoth, together with the Greek Hermes, have "a remarkable counterpart" in the Babylonian and Assyrian figure of Nabu, a.k.a. Nebo, son of Marduk, a.k.a. Merodach (PP 95). The gods and goddesses of Babylonia and Assyria form a complex network of relationships which, in turn, are descended from earlier Canaanite cults. The two main sources for information about the cults of Canaan are the *Ras Shamra* texts and certain ancient Hebrew writings.

The cosmogony of Babylonia included many triads of gods. There was, for example, the triad of Enlil (god of earth, air, storm), Anu (sky), and Ea (waters). There were also triads of demons, such as that of Labartu, Labasu, and Akhkhazu. The principle triad, however, consisted of Sin (moon), Shamash (sun), and Ishtar (star). Ishtar, a fertility goddess, was the lover and consort of Tammuz (another name for Marduk/Merodach). Over time, Babylonian deities came to be associated with planets, as well: Marduk with Jupiter; Ishtar with Venus; and Nebo with Mercury. Also over time, these deities came to be protectors of specific Babylonian cities. Hence, they became "local gods." Marduk, for example, presided at Babylon itself. During the reign of Hammurabi, several gods were conflated and their characteristics were attributed to Marduk, who supplanted them. Later still, the name Marduk became a title, *Belu* (Lord), which was commonly truncated to *Bel* (while his wife became *Belit*, or "Lady par excellence"). Of course, as Derrida acknowledges, it is widely known how these deities connect with Greek and Roman gods and goddesses. It is also known that they connect with triadic Hindu deities. Armstrong remarks that "Hinduism [and Buddhism are related and] can be seen as a reformed paganism" (*History* 411, n. 44). Much could be said about the various manifestations of Babylonian deities; however, it is the goddess Ishtar which will lead to a reconsideration of *phallogocentrism*. Ishtar descends from the Canaanite goddess Ashtoreth (Phoenician Astarte) whose role, in the *Ras Shamra* texts, overlaps the roles of two other goddesses, Anath and Asherah.

Asherah is the consort of El, *a.k.a.* the Canaanite high god, Dagon. El is a generic title applied to many gods, including the high god of ancient Israel, *Yahweh*, who is sometimes referred to as *El Shaddai*. Dagon, the Canaanite El, is described in the *Ras Shamra* texts as a murderer and adulterer who dethrones his father and has him castrated. (Dagon's father is not a god.)

As consort to El, Asherah is "mother of the gods." El and Asherah have two children: the goddess Anath, and the god Baal -- and these two children are married. But, Baal has another wife in Ashtoreth, as well.

At this juncture, the time has come to link this chain of significations with the *phallus*, and then with the *logos*.

The worship of Baal involved the use of sacred pillars of stacked stone, while the parallel worship of Asherah/ Anath/Ashtoreth involved the use of sacred poles of wood. The pillars were called *baalim* by the ancient Israelites; the poles were called *asherim*. Some translators have tried to render *asherim* as "groves" rather than as sacred poles. The difficulty in

this rendering, however, is seen in texts such as 2 Kings 23:6, which tells of bringing the Asherah from out of the temple in Jerusalem and burning it; or 2 Chron. 34:7, which reads: "broke the sacred pillars to pieces, and cut down the sacred pole." Both Baal and Asherah were deities connected with fertility, and while their emblems were both vertical, these respectively represented the male and female principles in a text such as *Deuteronomy* 7:5-6, which refers to *both* pillars and poles as Asherah (*asherim*).

The Israelites are often described as "serving the Baals and the sacred poles" (*Judges* 3:7). King Manasseh, for example, erected a sacred pole in the temple at Jerusalem (2 *Kings* 21:7). Apparently, Manasseh returned to the worship of Yahweh, but his son Amon again instituted the worship of Baal and Asherah (2 *Chron.* 33:11-13, 15, 21-23). These latter fertility rites involved what Armstrong describes as "sacred sex" employing male and female prostitutes (46-47). Closely associated with this form of worship were human sacrifices (often of children) to Molech, the Ammonite manifestation of Baal. Thus, when it is said that the ancient Israelites "went after the Baalim and the Asherah", it is understood to mean that they participated in sexual relations with temple prostitutes and sacrificed human beings. Of course, these practices were repugnant to the god they had abandoned, Yahweh, who forbade such *phallocentrism* (*Jeremiah* 19:4-5).

Considering the antipathy of Yahweh toward the phallus (sacred poles), it is interesting to reconsider the ceremony of the *pharmakos* or scapegoat *vis-à-vis* Jesus of Nazareth as Messiah (Heb. *mashiah*; Gk. *khristos*) or "anointed one." His manner of death may have special resonance considering that, within Judeo-Christianity, he is regarded as the sacrificial Lamb which atones for the shortcomings or lawlessness (*i.e.*, sin) of humanity. Of course, this is also the function of the scapegoat. But more than this, Jesus is recorded in the Greek scriptures as having been nailed to a *stauros* (σταυρον), a standing pole without a cross-bar -- or, what in Latin is the *crux simplex*. This understanding of the word is reflected in not a few medieval and renaissance paintings.

Derrida argues that *logos* is itself a *pharmakon* -- which is to say, neither good nor bad -- and that making *logos* into a Good is a determination (an act of will?) (PP 115). Gorgias, after all, tells of a potential for "evil persuasion" within *logos* (PP 114). This is congruent with Judeo-Christian texts in which the original serpent (metaphorically, Satan; Rev. 12:7-12) possessed speech (a manifestation of *logos*) in the Garden of Eden and used it to deceive (*Genesis* 2). Later, The Logos (*i.e.*, Jesus, according to John 1:1) declined a drug ("gall" [χολης], a *pharmakon*) while hanging on the *stauros* (Matt. 27:32-33). Perhaps all this is too far afield. Still, one recalls that René Girard, whose writings are concerned with "violence against arbitrarily chosen scapegoats, "has become "a religious thinker, for whom the Christian revelation, with its authentic [...] sacrificial victim, offers the only escape from the violence of mimetic desire" (Culler, 29).

23. Cf. *Hokusai* n. 68, p. 17.

24. Isaac de la Peyrere; see *Hokusai* n. 38, p. 11.

25. Richard Elliot Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible?* (New York: Summit Books, 1987); 18.

26. Respecting the Torah, Friedman states in his main text that "nowhere in the Five Books of Moses themselves does the text say that he was the author" (17). Then, in an endnote, Friedman elaborates:

"There is an account in the book of Deuteronomy of Moses' writing a "scroll of the torah" before his death [...] but the account in Deuteronomy does not claim that the scroll contained the entire text of all five books on it (Deut. 31:9,24-26). The word torah here in Deuteronomy 31 does not necessarily mean the Torah [...] the word can also simply mean instruction in general (n.1, p. 261; emphasis supplied)."

Friedman's explanation suggests, then, that the word *torah* can also simply mean Torah -- or, that the word *torah* does not necessarily **not** mean Torah. No doubt this may be seen as an example of undecidable, even indeterminate meaning.

27. See *Hokusai* n. 3, pp. 3, 4.

28. Friedman claims these sources: *J* (Yahwist), produced in Judah; *E* (Eloist), produced in Israel; *P* (Priestly Codex), embedded within *E*; and *D* (Deuteronomist), "fashioned" by a redactor of the previous sources, who also wrote the six books following *D* (51, 62, 117).

29. Scholars disagree over which source is oldest (an alternative order is P, E, J, D; see Friedman 81, 84, 87).

30. The foregoing sketch constitutes a *diachronic* progression which would necessarily help explain or clarify a *synchronic* analysis. I mention this to counter Culler's view that "[diachronic and synchronic analyses] must be kept separate lest the diachronic point of view falsify ones synchronic analysis" (*Poetics* 12).

It is far beyond the scope of this essay to give any consideration to the tension between these two approaches. However, I should say that both approaches seem necessary; and, further, that they are not mutually exclusive but, rather, reinforcing. A brilliant example of how these

two approaches may be synthesized is found in Michael Aung-Thwin, *Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma* (Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1985).

31. Translations: *AV* Authorized Version (*a.k.a.* "King James"; 1611); *RSV* Revised Standard Version (1952); *AS* American Standard Version (1901); *NW* New World Translation (1984); *LB* Living Bible (1971); *GN* Good News Bible (1976).

32. Karen Anderson, *A History of God* (New York: Knopf, 1993) 3-5.

33. Joanne Zitelli, Letter to the author (30 August 1997).

34. Roy Harris, *The Language Connection* (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996) 179-181.

35. "Every concept presupposes a collection of perceptions, and every perception presupposes a concept; yet this ancient difficulty has never paralyzed thought. It is easy to demonstrate a priori our inability to accomplish such and such an intellectual operation -- an operation, indeed, which we carry out constantly. It has been by setting aside these little games of the Sceptics that all progress of the human mind, especially in the sciences, has been made. In certain of its aspects, existential subjectivism does nothing but dig up this much-picked bone." Raymond Picard, *New Criticism or New Fraud*, tr. Frank Towne (Washington State U P, 1969) 22.

36. Donald E. Pease, "Author" in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, Frank Lentriccia and Thomas McLaughlin, eds. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990) 106.

37. Pease 110-111.

38. *Cf.* Bourbongois 87, *supra*, citing *Chuang Tzu*.

39. Asks Picard: "Should the profound be associated with the obscure and the invisible?" (43). The answer may be "Nes and Yo," as James Joyce has it. According to Graff, "Ambiguity [...] is a necessary and valuable attribute in a literary work" (164).

40. Annabel Patterson, "Intention" in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, 136; citing William J. Brennan, Jr., "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification"; speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 12 October 1985.

41. It is my interpretation of a writer who has recorded and interpreted a speaker -- and it is based solely upon the evidence available to me. I have relied upon Patterson's accuracy and authority. I have also relied upon the editors of the book in which Patterson's essay appears. Did these editors change anything significant? If so, was the change away from or toward accuracy *vis-à-vis* Brennan's remarks and Patterson's take on those remarks? Finally, how is a reader to know whether I am reporting Patterson accurately in this essay? As I shall argue by and by, it is a case of best evidence. Perhaps the footnotes I have included will help resolve the issue(s). Of course, a reader must trust that I am pointing in the right direction. And, if I am not, can a reader find it out? Again, it will be a case of best evidence.

42. Idos 72, *supra*.

43. But since I have conjured the team, we could (if we wish) be very clever. We could assert that *Hokusai* is now irrevocably connected to the 1919 Chicago Black Sox -- very much in the same way that Socrates conjured all the witnesses in his behalf by telling the Athenian Court that he would not (as would other men in his situation) call upon them.

Wait a minute: this could be my big chance. By this reference I hereby incorporate everything lisible and illisible that has ever existed -- or ever will exist. Admittedly, my book is now about *Fanny's First Date* -- but it also now incorporates *War and Peace*. If Pynchon writes another book, this book will be about that book, too. What an easy link, and not a bit of the cheat about it.

44. H.C. Earwicker, "Publisher's Foreword" xvi, *supra*.

45. This may explain why Appendix A, *Feast of the Epicleti*, is missing. That is, Thomas Jefferson found it objectionable.

46. *Hokusai* n.104(2), p. 24.

47. Bart D. Ehrman, *The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture* (Oxford UP, 1993) 29-31.

48. Ehrman 275-276.

49. Susanne L. Wofford, ed. *Hamlet: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism* (Boston: Bedford-St. Martin's, 1994) 15.

50. *Second Quarto* (1604); *First Folio* (1623); *Third Folio* (1676-85; the so-called "Smock Alley" promptbooks).

51. Act IV, Scene 6. See G.A. James, "Afterword" 50-51, *supra*.

52. Cf. *Hokusai* 10, n.35 par. 3; and Syntagmalova 105, n.11, *supra*.

53. James Joyce, *Ulysses*, ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Vintage, 1986).

54. See G.A. James, "Afterword" 50-51, *supra*.

55. Jason P. Rosenblatt, "Aspects of the Incest Problem in Hamlet"; *Shakespeare Quarterly* 29.3 (1978): 357.

56. *Ibid.* 360.

57. *Ibid.* 362.

58. *Hamlet* I.ii.65.

59. Rosenblatt 358.

60. Wofford 154.

61. *Ibid.* 156.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Rosenblatt 357.

64. Wofford 16.

65. *Ibid.* 18.

66. Earnshaw 69.

67. Curiously, the phrase "effect of meaning" is readily understood, due to the context. Equally curious is that the very phrase "effect of meaning" implies that "meaning" is the cause of an effect (which has a meaning) -- which means that "meaning" produces itself. The cause and the effect are thus one and the same.

68. *Ulysses* xii (emphasis supplied).

69. James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*, R.B. Kershner, ed. (Boston: Bedford-St. Martin's, 1993) 142.

70. *Encyclopedia Judaica* Vol. XI (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971) 1289.

71. *Oxford Companion to the Bible*, B.M. Metzger and M.D. Coogan, eds. (New York: Oxford UP, 1993) 511.

72. *Psalms* 76:12

73. *Hebrews* 7:1,2

74. *Judaica* 1288.

75. *AS*.

76. *Judaica* 1290.

77. *Heb.* 6:20, NW.

78. *Portrait* 143.

79. *Hokusai* 7, n. 22.

80. Gerald Graff, "Indeterminacy" in Lentriccia and McLaughlin, 163.

81. See e.g., "The Diversity of Early Christianity."

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/first/diversity.html>

82. J.D. Douglas et al., eds., *New Bible Dictionary* (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1982) 426.

83. This brings me to a consideration of a possibility which will be readily seen as beyond the scope of this paper, certainly, and perhaps also beyond the reach of science: namely, the claim of these canonical texts that there is a Spirit which is operational upon the "true church," and which guides them in distinguishing "true doctrine" from "false." Myself having had no experience of this, nor means to measure it in others, there is nothing I can say about it.

84. Barbara Hernstein Smith, "Value/Evaluation" in Lentriccia and McLaughlin, 178-180.

85. Robert Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (New York: Morrow, 1974) 225, 226.

86. *Ibid.* 280

87. I confess some difficulty with Pirsig's assertions respecting quality. Pirsig states that "Quality, value, creates the subjects and objects of the world" (280). Here, quality and value are synonymous. He further writes that "value-traps" entail "an inability to revalue what one sees because of commitment to previous [rigid] values" which make revaluation "impossible" (279-280).

Given that value and quality are synonymous, we might work a substitution. Pirsig's statement would then describe an inability to revalue "because of commitment to previous [rigid] quality." That is, quality is in the way of quality. If the difficulty is not yet clear, then let me add that Pirsig explicitly states that Quality is the Tao (228). The Tao is, of course, the Way of Nature. Pirsig is then seen to assert that the Way of Nature is getting in the way of the Way of Nature. That is, Tao is frustrating the revaluation of Tao.

Nevertheless, I do not think Pirsig is entirely off the mark. His cumulative argument that quality is conspicuous in its absence is, for me, quite convincing (*passim*; e.g., 185).

88. Steven Connor, *Postmodern Culture* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1989) 8.

89. Edward Hoagland, *The Courage of Turtles* (San Francisco: North Point P, 1985) 5.

90. *Encyclopedia of Ethics* Vol. I, Lawrence C. Becker, ed. (New York: Garland, 1992) 406-7.

91. The fact of the Rule is deducible from the application of two innate human capacities, rationality and memory. (It may be said that language itself has just brought into being that which is not yet proved; but please forbear.) The Rule is discoverable in the simplest daily transactions, but I will propose a hypothetical. (It should be said that, of course, human beings are born with several capacities; and also that there is more than one mode of thought. However, memory and rationality are all that is required here.)

Suppose that you and I can both think and remember. Suppose also that you do something and I complain it. Time passes. Then I do something, in fact the same thing, to you. Now, you remember my past complaint and you recall it to me. As I listen, we have come to the threshold of the ethical realm -- when you ask me why I have done the very thing which I complained. This is because a claim is being made, without even having been spoken.

The claim is that, although you and I are distinct, yet we are the same. We are made of the same stuff, and we have the same capacities. We even have the same origin, whether we take Lucy for an ancestor or Adam.

Because we are both human and similarly situated, if one of us may make a claim, so may the other. Reflexivity leads to empathy which requires reciprocity. However, it does not compel -- and this fact I take to be the point of free will.

After listening to you and remembering, I can do one of two things: acknowledge your claim, in which case we enter the ethical realm; or, ignore your claim. This seems simple enough, and no doubt happens often. But when I ignore your claim I deny it -- and in order to do that, I must impliedly deny that you and I are similarly situated and made of the same stuff. This is to say that I must offend rationality -- or, to put it more bluntly, live a lie. From this, it becomes apparent that hypocrisy consists, at least in part, in exploiting the principle when it is expedient -- or, in paying lip service to a claim.

When I deny that you and I are made of similar stuff, I am denying your humanity. (Of course, before Jews and others were put into labor camps, there was an official ideology in place which claimed that one race was a superior form of humanity while the other was not fully human.) Having denied your humanity, then I might objectify you. I might treat you badly (in a way that I would not like to be treated) or use you as a means to my own ends. The extreme example here is slavery; a lesser example is exploitation of workers; another still is simple manipulation, which is usually the reason for telling falsehoods.

All ethical behaviour follows from this principle of reciprocity. If I do not want to be murdered, then I should not murder. If I complain when stolen from, I therefore should not steal. If I want a fair wage, then I should pay one. If I would have you be impartial, then so must I be. And if I would not be compelled, then I should not compel -- which is why the principle, itself, does not compel. To do otherwise is to objectify.

This is the point where I am wary of Connor's remark, "There are no absolute grounds of value which can compel assent" (8; emphasis supplied). By this I mean to say that an absolute ground does exist, but to compel assent is contrary to that ground.

The principle of reciprocity is of general applicability. It is procedural, and therefore it is a principle of autonomy (insofar as it allows individual judgment). But again, it does lead to specific extrapolations regarding "big-ticket" items such as murder, theft, perjury, etc.

Wilson has recently advanced an empirical argument respecting morality. Interestingly, he employs the term reciprocity to describe the delicate web of cooperative relations he posits among a band of Paleolithic hunters. See "The Biological Basis of Morality," *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1998: 59.

92. Now for a thread in the opposite direction: it is possible to imagine scenarios which would complicate the application of the principle (e.g., is it permissible to steal food when one is starving?) Turned around, the question is whether it is permissible to let your neighbor starve. Well, we do not live in an ideal world. Whether the world is redeemable and injustices will be

set right is, of course, a major theme of a major metanarrative (and may, perhaps, explain the critical path of Rene Girard; Culler 29).

93. See 230, *supra*.

94. Rosenblatt 357, n.30

95. Edward O. Wilson, "Back From Chaos," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1998: 62.

96. *Ibid.*

97. John McGowan, *Postmodernism and Its Critics* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991) 181, n.47.

98. Bernstein 18, 19.

99. Richard J. Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) 25.

100. Wilson 42

101. Bernstein 5, 6.

102. "JoAnn's Secret," prod. Gabrielle Messina, ed. Jim Sabat, 20/20, ABC, KMGH Denver, 17 April 1998. This program concerned activist and author JoAnn Loulan.

103. It has come to my attention that a California man recently decided that he is a woman. Without trans-sexual surgery (or even cross-dressing), he has been able to obtain a driver's license and other official documents which classify him as a woman. The man's argument that he should be regarded as a woman is predicated on economic considerations. He is not able to afford trans-sexual surgery, and this fact precludes and therefore prejudices his ability to become a woman. Presumably, the State's deference to the man's wishes was a result of ambiguity or uncertainty vis-à-vis the theoretical distinction between sex and gender.

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104. Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," included in Habermas, 174.
105. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957) 212.
106. Rorty 170, 171.
107. Wilson 48
108. *Ibid.* 62.
109. C. Michael Mahon, Letter to the author (31 July 1997).
110. Mortimer Adler and William Gorman, eds. *Syntopicon*, Vol. 2 (Chicago: U of Chicago P and *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1952) 963.
111. *Ibid.* 731, 733.
112. *Ibid.* 734
113. *Ibid.* 730
114. Frye 121.
115. "Anagogically, then, the symbol is a monad, all symbols being united in a single infinite and eternal verbal symbol which is, as *diamia*, the *logos*, and, as *mythos*, total creative act. It is this conception which Joyce expresses, in terms of subject matter, as 'epiphany,' and Hopkins, in terms of form, as 'inscape'" (Frye 121).
116. Earnshaw 70.
117. Wilson 58.

118. Graff 168.

119. Ibid. 175.

120. See Derrida's *Limited Inc* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1993) 115.

121. It is time to confess: I have it on authority that the disputed line in Appendix A reads: And so the Hong Kong market is guarded by alate simulacra. Cf. Bourbongois 92; Syntagmalova 106, *supra*.

122. And, the canon has been expanded to include certain books by an author who goes by the name of Derrida.

123. Jean Baudrillard, "Reversion of History" (par. 2, electronic text).

124. Joyce Cary, *The Horse's Mouth* (1944).

N.B. Derrida was critical of American analytic philosophers (as well as American practitioners of deconstruction) who either misunderstood or ignored the distinction between 'undecidability' and 'indeterminacy' and then misapplied his theories. His objections are stated in *Limited, Inc.* – See endnote 120, above; and *The Village Idiot* No. 16 (PDF).

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